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ABSTRACT: In an attempt to control rapid growth in hospital costs, beginning in the mid-
1970s several states implemented rate-setting programs to regulate hospital payments. In 
seven states, rate-setting was in effect for a substantial period of time (14 years or more). 
While most of these programs were discontinued by the mid-1990s, two are still active. In 
five of the seven states, the rates of increase in hospital costs were lower than the corre-
sponding national rates during the periods in which the regulation programs were in place. 
Four of the states—Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, and New Jersey—had some 
of the lowest rates of hospital cost increases among all the states. This indicates that hos-
pital rate regulation may be a useful approach in managing a major component of health 
care spending.
                    
InTRoduCTIon
From 1970 to 1975, spending on hospital services grew at an annual rate of 13.4 
percent.1 In an attempt to slow this growth, the states of Connecticut, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Washington, and West Virginia enacted 
legislation in the 1970s and early 1980s that established hospital rate-setting 
programs. Rate-setting programs are operated by commissions established by 
the state legislature or by an agency of the state government. They set limits on 
the rates or budgets of the hospitals. Some use a formula-based approach, some 
review rates or budgets of hospitals individually, and some use a mix of these 
two approaches. Evaluations of the impact of state rate-setting generally have 
found that it was effective in slowing the growth of hospital costs.2 However, in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, increasing emphasis on competition and man-
aged care led to the dismantling of most of these state systems. Five of the seven 
states terminated their programs by 1996, while two states—Maryland and West 
Virginia—still have active rate-setting programs.3 This issue brief examines the 
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ReSulTS
State Rate-Setting Was Successful in Most 
States Where It Was Tried
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and 
Washington had their regulatory systems in place by 
1975, and Connecticut implemented its rate-setting 
mechanism in 1976. Thus, it is reasonable to use 1974 
as the base year for comparisons. The average annual 
increase in costs per EIPA was calculated for each of 
these states from 1974 until the year each dropped rate 
regulation. These increases are presented in Exhibit 1, 
along with the comparable increase for the U.S. as a 
whole. Exhibit 1 also includes state and U.S. increases 
from the year that regulation stopped until 2007, so 
that the relative increases after regulation ended can be 
compared with the increases under regulation.
The data indicate that rate-setting regulations 
were successful in controlling state hospital costs in 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York 
relative to the U.S. rate of increase. In Connecticut 
and Washington, costs increased faster than in the U.S. 
during the periods in which those two states were regu-
lated. In West Virginia, costs stayed about the same as 
the national rate.
Since rate regulation ended in New Jersey and 
Washington, hospital costs in those states have gone 
up faster than they have nationwide. In Connecticut, 
the state-specific rate has been lower than the national 
rate since regulation ended. In Massachusetts and New 
York, the state-specific rate since regulation ended has 
been about the same as the national rate.
Exhibit 2 presents the cost data for 1974 through 
1992, comparing the increases in hospital costs over 
the period when regulation was at its peak. The year 
1974 was selected as the starting point for this com-
parison because Maryland and New Jersey began 
regulation that year, New York already had regula-
tion in place, and Connecticut, Massachusetts, and 
Washington implemented regulation within two years. 
The year 1992 was selected as the endpoint because it 
was the point at which half the rate-setting states had 
discontinued their regulation. Among all states, with 
and without regulation, Maryland had the lowest rate 
changes in hospital costs and charges in states that had 
or still have rate-setting programs. It also considers 
what happened when five states terminated their rate-
setting programs.
HoW THIS STudy WAS ConduCTed
Data on hospital costs and charges for the United 
States as a whole and in the regulated states for the 
period 1974 to 2007 were extracted from AHA Hospital 
Statistics, an annual publication of the American 
Hospital Association.4
For each of the five states that terminated 
their regulatory programs, the increase in the cost per 
equivalent inpatient admission (EIPA) was calculated 
from the implementation to the discontinuation of rate-
setting, and then from that date to 2007. Although the 
precise year in which rate-setting started or ended may 
be subject to interpretation, the dates used in this anal-
ysis are a reasonable representation of when the state 
programs were most likely to have had an impact on 
hospital cost growth. For example, Maryland froze the 
rates of all hospitals in 1974 and published an allowed 
increase every six months, but took two years to review 
and set the rates of all the hospitals. So, while regula-
tion started in 1974, full implementation of rate-setting 
did not occur until 1976.
Conforming to the standard definition used by 
the American Hospital Association and in most analy-
ses of hospital payments and costs, EIPAs are used here 
as measure of hospital workload. EIPAs are a count of 
inpatient admissions adjusted upward to account for 
the volume of outpatient services. The formula used is: 
equivalent inpatient admissions = inpatient admissions 
× (total inpatient and outpatient revenue/inpatient rev-
enue). This can thought of as converting an outpatient 
visit to a fraction of an inpatient admission, the fraction 
being the revenue for an outpatient visit divided by the 
revenue for an inpatient admission. The number of out-
patient equivalent admissions is this fraction times the 
number of outpatient visits; the outpatient equivalent 
admissions are added to the inpatient admissions to 
arrive at a total number of EIPAs.
State HoSpital Rate-Setting ReviSited 3
of increase in costs per EIPA from 1974 to1992, while 
Massachusetts had the third-lowest rate of increase in 
this time period. New York had the fourth-lowest rate 
and New Jersey the ninth-lowest rate.
These results strongly suggest that state rate-
setting was successful at controlling the rate of increase 
in hospital costs in most of the states that implemented 
this type of regulation. However, it does not appear to 
have been successful in Connecticut and Washington, 
since the increases in costs per EIPA in these states 
exceeded the corresponding national increases.
Exhibit 3 shows the average annual increase 
in cost per EIPA from 1974 to 2007 for all states and 
the U.S. The budget review system in Rhode Island 
(described below) appears to have been remarkably 
successful in controlling hospital cost increases, with 
the rate of cost increase matching that in the most suc-
cessfully regulated states. Maryland, Massachusetts, 
and New York have the second-, third-, and fourth-
lowest rates of hospital cost increases, respectively, of 
any states over this time period.
Hospital Charges Increase Faster  
Than Costs
Over the past 30 years, but particularly in the last 
decade, hospitals across the U.S. have been increasing 
their charges faster than the rate of increase in the 
costs of providing care. This is partly because most 
payers negotiate discounts for services and therefore 
pay scant attention to hospital charges. Further, some 
aspects of the payment system reward high charges 
relative to costs. For example, some hospitals have 
rapidly increased their charges in order to increase their 
Medicare outpatient payments, and to exploit a loop-
hole in the Medicare payment for outliers.5 But rapidly 
rising charges increase the liability of patients who still 
pay “retail” rates for care—many of whom are unin-
sured and therefore least able to pay. In 1974, hospital 
charges were 5 percent higher than costs nationwide 
and 9 percent higher than costs in Maryland (where 
rate-setting had just been implemented). By 2007, this 
had changed dramatically, with charges 182 percent 
above costs in the U.S. but only 21 percent above costs 
in Maryland, which still had rate-setting regulations  
in place.
Hospital Cost Trends in  
Rate-Setting States
Exhibits 4 through 10 show trends in hospital costs 
among states that had or still have rate-setting pro-
grams. Specifically, they show the ratio of the cost per 
EIPA in each state to the U.S. cost per EIPA, from 1974 
Exhibit 1. Average Annual Increases in Hospital Costs per EIPA 
1974 Until End of Rate-Setting Program and From End of Program Until 2007
State
Years  
Regulated
Increase  
Under  
Rate-Setting
U.S.  
Comparison
Increase After  
Rate-Setting
U.S.  
Comparison
Connecticut 1976–1994 11.9% 11.7% 2.3% 3.5%
Maryland 1974–present 6.9% 7.7% n/a n/a
Massachusetts 1975–1991 10.2% 12.0% 4.2% 4.1%
New Jersey 1974–1992 10.7% 11.2% 4.0% 3.6%
New York 1971–1996 8.5%* 9.5% 4.0% 4.1%
Washington 1975–1989 13.7% 12.5% 5.4% 4.5%
West Virginia 1985–present 5.0% 5.3% n/a n/a
* Rate of increase from 1974 through 1996. 
Note: EIPA is equivalent inpatient admissions. The formula used is:  
equivalent inpatient admissions = inpatient admissions x (total inpatient and outpatient revenue/inpatient revenue). 
Source: American Hospital Association, AHA Hospital Statistics.
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Exhibit 2. Average Annual Increase in Cost per EIPA, 1974–1992
Rank State Increase
U.S. 11.03
1 Maryland 9.00
2 Rhode Island 9.09
3 Massachusetts 9.28
4 New York 9.71
5 Arizona 10.28
6 Michigan 10.33
7 Wisconsin 10.46
8 Illinois 10.58
9 New Jersey 10.60
10 Vermont 10.65
11 Minnesota 10.82
12 Nevada 10.83
13 California 10.84
14 Delaware 10.87
15 Ohio 10.91
16 Pennsylvania 11.04
17 Connecticut 11.23
18 Oregon 11.25
19 Mississippi 11.30
20 Virginia 11.42
21 District of Columbia 11.44
22 Missouri 11.47
23 West Virginia 11.48
24 Indiana 11.49
25 Maine 11.57
26 Florida 11.64
27 Iowa 11.72
28 Oklahoma 11.75
29 Washington 11.79
30 Kansas 11.82
31 Alabama 11.83
32 Idaho 11.85
33 Nebraska 11.92
34 Kentucky 11.96
35 Georgia 12.06
36 North Carolina 12.07
37 Arkansas 12.26
38 Colorado 12.29
39 Tennessee 12.31
40 North Dakota 12.32
41 Louisiana 12.33
42 New Hampshire 12.37
43 Utah 12.41
44 S. Dakota 12.43
45 New Mexico 12.44
46 Hawaii 12.57
47 Texas 12.64
48 Montana 12.72
49 Wyoming 12.85
50 S. Carolina 12.96
51 Alaska 13.48
Note: EIPA is equivalent inpatient admissions. The formula used is:  
equivalent inpatient admissions = inpatient admissions x (total inpatient and outpatient revenue/inpatient revenue). 
Source: American Hospital Association, AHA Hospital Statistics.
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Exhibit 3. Average Annual Increase in Cost per EIPA, 1974–2007
Rank State Increase
United States 7.69%
1 Rhode Island 6.94
2 Maryland 6.95
3 Massachusetts 6.96
4 New York 7.00
5 Michigan 7.08
6 Illinois 7.15
7 Connecticut 7.23
8 Arizona 7.24
9 Florida 7.34
10 Alabama 7.41
11 Pennsylvania 7.47
12 Ohio 7.53
13 Nevada 7.58
14 New Jersey 7.58
15 Kansas 7.73
16 West Virginia 7.73
17 Delaware 7.76
18 California 7.77
19 Oklahoma 7.79
20 Vermont 7.82
21 Louisiana 7.82
22 Missouri 7.86
23 Wisconsin 7.93
24 Tennessee 7.93
25 Minnesota 7.95
26 Virginia 7.97
27 Kentucky 7.98
28 Iowa 8.01
29 North Carolina 8.16
30 Georgia 8.18
31 Indiana 8.25
32 North Dakota 8.26
33 Hawaii 8.26
34 District of Columbia 8.28
35 Arkansas 8.30
36 Maine 8.38
37 Oregon 8.42
38 Nebraska 8.44
39 New Mexico 8.45
40 Mississippi 8.46
41 Texas 8.46
42 Idaho 8.53
43 South Carolina 8.57
44 Colorado 8.62
45 Utah 8.69
46 Washington 8.69
47 Montana 8.91
48 South Dakota 9.04
49 Wyoming 9.08
50 New Hampshire 9.12
51 Alaska 9.20
Note: EIPA is equivalent inpatient admissions. The formula used is:  
equivalent inpatient admissions = inpatient admissions x (total inpatient and outpatient revenue/inpatient revenue). 
Source: American Hospital Association, AHA Hospital Statistics.
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through 2007. (In the case of Maryland, there is no ter-
mination date; in the case of West Virginia, the vertical 
line indicates when rate-setting was initiated.)
Connecticut (Exhibit 4). The legislation setting up 
Connecticut’s rate-setting system was enacted in 1973, 
and regulation began in 1976. The program was oper-
ated by an independent commission and involved a 
review of hospital rates with guidelines specified in 
regulation, hearings, and negotiation.6 It was termi-
nated in 1994. Over the period it regulated hospital 
rates, the cost per EIPA in Connecticut increased faster 
than the national average—550 percent in Connecticut 
versus 529 percent in the U.S. as a whole. Since 1994, 
the cost per EIPA in Connecticut has increased less 
than the national increase—34 percent versus 57 per-
cent for the U.S. The program in Connecticut suffered 
from the disadvantage that its administrators were 
never provided sufficient authority to enforce compli-
ance with the approved rates.
Hospital rate-setting in Connecticut has had a 
checkered history. The method used to set the rates of 
the hospitals changed three times, and the system has 
been the subject of much controversy.
The first rate-setting system, set up in 1976, 
involved an annual review of hospital cost and rev-
enue budgets. Prior to the start of their fiscal year, 
hospitals submitted their budgets to the Commission 
on Hospitals and Health Care for review and approval. 
This system resulted in considerable antagonism 
between the Commission and the hospitals, resulting 
in numerous court challenges to Commission deci-
sions. The system was then  simplified by imposing a 
criterion that if the hospital’s cost per EIPA increased 
by less than a trend factor plus two percentage points, 
then the hospital was exempted from any further 
review. Certain hospitals took advantage of a loophole 
in this constraint (the limit was on cost increases, not 
on revenue increases) and the ensuing uproar from 
payers resulted in the implementation of a diagnosis-
related group (DRG) pricing system. This system failed 
to control rate increases, and experienced the prob-
lems that plague DRG pricing systems, for example, 
individual patients receiving bills that were dispropor-
tionate to the services provided. It was replaced by a 
system that established constraints on the increase in 
total net and gross revenue of each hospital each year, 
with a detailed review of the hospital budget for hospi-
tals that failed these screens. Under this system, hospi-
tals billed patients on the basis of the itemized charges 
for the services provided.
The DRG pricing system in Connecticut set 
a rate for each DRG, and the hospitals had to charge 
on the basis of the approved DRG rates. These rates 
were paid by all non-Medicare payers, but there 
was an appeal mechanism for self-pay patients who 
thought they had been overcharged. The base year for 
the rates was the fiscal year ending in 1986, and the 
approved revenues were based on the revenues that 
were approved by the Commission in that year, so that 
the rates were hospital-specific. This rate was adjusted 
forward for inflation and a medical technology factor, 
with capital costs and malpractice costs included at the 
level at which they were actually incurred. An impor-
tant feature of this system was that the Medicare and 
Medicaid shortfalls were capped. The amount built into 
the private-sector rates for the Medicare and Medicaid 
payment shortfalls was frozen at the level of the short-
fall in 1986. Outlier payments were made for cases in 
which patients had a long length of stay.
Exhibit 4. Connecticut Cost Per EIPA Relative to the United States
Year
Connecticut  cost per EIPA/U.S. cost per EIPA
Source: American Hospital Association, AHA Hospital Statistics.
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Because the DRGs were, and to some extent still 
are, poor predictors of resource use for psychiatric and 
rehabilitation cases, per-diem rates were established for 
psychiatric and rehabilitation units and hospitals.
Maryland (Exhibit 5). Maryland’s rate-setting legis-
lation was enacted in 1971 and a reporting and rate-
setting system was developed over the next three years; 
rate-setting actually began in 1974. The program is 
operated by an independent commission (the Maryland 
Health Services Cost Review Commission, or HSCRC) 
and involves a review of hospital rates with guidelines 
specified in regulation, hearings, and negotiation. 
However, most hospital rates are updated by a formula-
driven update factor each year, and very few individual 
hospital reviews are required.7
This program is still in operation and covers  
all payers, including Medicare and Medicaid. 
From 1974 to 2007, the cost per EIPA increase in 
Maryland—878 percent, versus a national increase of 
1,088 percent—was the second-lowest in the nation 
(after Rhode Island).
Through 1992, Maryland was extremely suc-
cessful in keeping the cost per EIPA increases below 
the corresponding national increases. However, a 
change in state policy around 1992 that favored 
profitability over rate-setting reversed this trend. For 
five years, Maryland experienced increases in costs 
that were substantially higher than the rate of national 
increases. Another policy change occurred around 
1996, when the HSCRC concluded that loosening of 
the financial constraints had allowed costs to increase 
too much and modified the formula used to calculate 
allowable rate increases. After this policy change, 
Maryland returned to the previous pattern, constraining 
hospital costs more effectively than the nationwide 
trend.
What differentiates Maryland’s program from 
the other rate-setting systems, and why has it survived 
when the others failed? McDonough’s analysis of the 
underlying reasons for the demise of other state rate-
setting systems points to two important reasons for the 
endurance of Maryland’s system: 1) the enabling leg-
islation was actually drafted by the Maryland Hospital 
Association, an organization that was run at the time 
by hospital trustees, and the hospital industry has 
continued to support it; and 2) the rate-setting system 
severely restricts the discounts that payers, includ-
ing health maintenance organizations (HMOs), can 
receive.8 Allowing unrestricted discounting to HMOs 
greatly contributed to the dissatisfaction on the part of 
hospitals with rate-setting in the other states.9 The fact 
that Medicare and Medicaid pay the rates set by the 
HSCRC is also a major contributing factor to the sur-
vival of the system.
Maryland’s has been the most stable of all the 
state rate-setting systems. Its design has evolved gradu-
ally, while some other states have made abrupt changes 
to their programs. Further, there has been effective 
cooperation between the state’s hospital industry and 
rate-setting body.
The rate-setting system, based partially on 
formulas and partially on detailed reviews, controls 
hospitals’ revenue or charges. The majority of hospitals 
receive an automatic formula adjustment to account for 
inflation, volume changes, change in the payer mix, 
and certain other factors. Hospitals found to have high 
charges receive either rate adjustments that are less 
than the rate of inflation or no adjustment; hospitals 
Exhibit 5. Maryland Cost Per EIPA Relative to the United States
Year
Maryland cost per EIPA/U.S. cost per EIPA
Source: American Hospital Association, AHA Hospital Statistics.
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found to have low charges and require additional rev-
enue can apply for a rate increase, which is subject to a 
detailed review.
Maryland has a mixed system in regard to the 
unit of output subject to rate control. It recognizes the 
differences among hospitals, both in terms of their abil-
ity to deal with a complicated rate-setting system and 
the nature of the market in which they operate. Some 
rural hospitals with relatively self-contained markets 
are regulated by means of a total revenue system, but 
the constraint on most hospitals is an approved charge 
per case, adjusted for the case mix of the hospital. The 
system is partly customized to the needs of a particular 
hospital.
Total revenue system. A few rural Maryland 
hospitals with relatively self-contained service areas 
are given a total revenue budget based on the approved 
revenue of that hospital for some base year. This 
amount is increased each year for inflation, plus a 
factor for new technology (initially 1 percent, then 
increased to 2 percent, and now determined each year) 
and 1 percent for population growth and aging (unless 
the hospital can justify a greater factor for population 
growth and aging). Certain appeal adjustments also 
are made, for example to take into account malpractice 
insurance costs. There are no adjustments for change in 
the volume of patients treated.
This system provides predictable revenue to the 
hospital. The hospitals charge patients on the basis of 
the actual services provided within the total approved 
revenue. For example, a patient who stays for two days 
will be charged less than a patient who stays for five 
days and has more services. If the hospital generates 
more than the approved revenue in one year, then the 
excess is deducted from its approved revenue for the 
subsequent year. Conversely, if the hospital generates 
less than its approved revenue in one year, then the 
shortfall is added to its approved revenue in the  
subsequent year.
Guaranteed inpatient revenue/charge per case. 
The system that applies to the majority of Maryland 
hospitals sets a guaranteed amount of revenue per case 
for inpatient services. The hospitals continue to charge 
patients on the basis of the itemized charges for the ser-
vices provided, but charges are constrained to be within 
the approved revenue per case after adjustment for the 
volume and case mix. The rates are normally increased 
each year using a formula that adjusts for inflation plus 
an allowance for new technology and other factors (ini-
tially 1 percent, then increased to 2 percent, and now 
determined by the Commission each year). Volume 
adjustments are made, with hospitals getting 85 percent 
of the average cost per case for each case above the 
budgeted level, and losing 85 percent of the average 
cost per case for each case below the budgeted level. 
The approved charge per case, which is both a floor 
and a ceiling on the revenue per case, is automatically 
adjusted for changes in the case mix experienced by 
the hospital, as well as for changes in the mix of payers 
experienced by the hospital.
All Maryland hospitals bill patients on the basis 
of the itemized charges for the services provided for 
that case, no matter which mechanism is used to con-
trol the total revenues.
The Maryland Hospital Association has pre-
pared a book describing in more detail the workings of 
the state’s rate-setting system, and also has commis-
sioned a book on the state’s history of rate-setting.10 
Both help to explain the success of Maryland’s rate-set-
ting program and the cooperative relationship between 
the rate-setting Commission and the hospital industry. 
The Executive Director of the HSCRC describes the 
system and its impact in some detail in a recently  
published paper.11
Massachusetts (Exhibit 6). The Massachusetts rate-
setting program commenced in 1975 and terminated 
in 1991. The program was operated by an indepen-
dent commission and involved a review of rates 
with guidelines specified in regulation, hearings, and 
negotiation.12 Over that time period, the increase in 
cost per EIPA in Massachusetts was 310 percent, 
compared with a national increase of 422 percent. 
From 1974 to 1992, Massachusetts had the third-
lowest rate of increase in cost per EIPA of any state, 
after Rhode Island and Maryland. Since regulation in 
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Massachusetts stopped, the increase has been slightly 
above the national rate: 94 percent in Massachusetts 
versus 90 percent for the U.S. as a whole.
The initial regulatory system set per-diem rates 
for Medicaid inpatient services and established controls 
on the total amounts that hospitals were permitted to 
charge for their services. The system involved a review 
using criteria established in regulation, with hearings 
when necessary and with flexibility for negotiation.
New Jersey (Exhibit 7). New Jersey started rate regu-
lation in 1974 and discontinued it in 1992. The pro-
gram was operated by the Department of Health, and 
involved a review of rates with guidelines specified in 
regulation and negotiation.13
From 1974 to 1992, costs per EIPA in New 
Jersey rose 520 percent, substantially less than the 579 
percent increase in the U.S. as a whole. This was the 
ninth-lowest rate of increase of any state over that time 
period. Since regulation stopped, costs per EIPA in 
New Jersey have increased faster than the nationwide 
rate, 80 percent versus a national rate of 70 percent.
New Jersey was the first state to use DRGs to 
set hospital prices. The state set a rate for each DRG 
in each hospital. The rate was a blend of a hospital-
specific cost and a statewide average cost for the case, 
with the percentage of the statewide average compo-
nent dependent on how homogeneous the costs were 
within the given DRG. The more consistent the costs 
within the DRG, the more a standard cost component 
would be built into the rate.
Until 1989 all payers, including Medicare and 
Medicaid, were charged using these DRG prices, with 
some payers receiving discounts. An appeal mecha-
nism was set up for self-pay patients who thought they 
had been overcharged, but this was abandoned in favor 
of a system in which patients with a short length of 
stay were charged a high per-diem rate, patients with a 
long length of stay were charged a lower per diem, and 
patients between the two thresholds were charged the 
DRG price. The rates were adjusted each year for  
inflation, changes in payer mix, changes in volume, 
and other appeals. This system was more formulis-
tic than the Maryland system, but less so than the 
Medicare system.
New York (Exhibit 8). New York started its regulatory 
program in 1971 and ended it in 1996. The program 
was operated by the Department of Health and was 
quite formulaic.14 Over that time period, costs per 
EIPA rose 506 percent in New York, compared with 
a national increase of 640 percent. New York had 
the fourth-lowest rate of increase of any state over 
the time period 1974 to 1992 (after Rhode Island, 
Maryland, and Massachusetts). Since regulation ended, 
the increase in costs per EIPA in New York has been 
Exhibit 7. New Jersey Cost Per EIPA 
Relative to the United States
Year
New Jersey cost per EIPA/U.S. cost per EIPA
Source: American Hospital Association, AHA Hospital Statistics.
Exhibit 6. Massachusetts Cost Per EIPA 
Relative to the United States
Year
Massachusetts cost per EIPA/U.S. cost per EIPA
Source: American Hospital Association, AHA Hospital Statistics.
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similar to the national rate of increase: 54 percent in 
New York versus 56 percent in the U.S. as a whole.
New York’s rate-setting system was changed 
substantially several times. During the late 1970s 
and early 1980s it was a per-diem system, with the 
approved per-diem rate based on the actually incurred 
costs of the individual hospital from three years prior 
to the year for which the rates were being set, with 
various penalties and adjustments for factors such as 
low occupancy and high average length of stay. Blue 
Cross and Medicaid paid the same per-diem rate, 
Medicare paid according to their own system, and most 
other payers were charged on the basis of the item-
ized charges for the actual services provided, with a 
control on the relationship between the average charge 
per day and the Blue Cross per-diem rate. In 1983 the 
way in which the per-diem rate for Blue Cross and 
Medicaid was calculated was changed. The base from 
which the per diem was developed was kept constant at 
the approved 1981 base costs, and inflation and other 
adjustments were applied each year to increase the  
per-diem rates.
New York State started a DRG-based system 
effective January 1, 1988. This system was a blend of 
DRG pricing and DRG revenue limits. For each hospi-
tal, a rate was set for each DRG. The rate for 1988 was 
90 percent hospital-specific and 10 percent based on 
a group standard. In subsequent years, the percentage 
of the standard rate was increased. In 1989, it was 75 
percent hospital-specific and 25 percent standard; in 
1990, it was 55 percent standard and 45 percent hospi-
tal-specific. The base year for the rates was 1981, with 
various adjustments for the intervening period. The 
rates were increased by an inflation factor each year, 
and capital, malpractice, and some other costs were 
paid at actually incurred levels. New York State had 
pools to pay for charity care and bad debts, and also a 
pool for distressed hospitals. There was an adjustment 
to the rate for large-volume changes (i.e., changes in 
excess of 10 percent).
Under the DRG-based system, the major payers 
for hospital services all paid a DRG price. Medicare 
and Medicaid paid the same rate, while private insur-
ance companies paid 113 percent of the Blue Cross 
rate. (New York, and other states such as Maryland, 
provided Blue Cross a discount because of their open 
enrollment policies.) Self-pay patients were billed the 
detailed charges for the services they received, with a 
cap on their billing at 120 percent of the rate that an 
insurance company would pay for the DRG. Thus if 
Blue Cross paid $2,000 for a case, an insurance com-
pany would pay $2,260 for the same case, and a self-
pay patient would pay the actual charges, but not more 
than $2,712.
When it started its DRG-based system, New 
York State decided that the Medicare DRGs were 
inadequate for their purposes and greatly expanded 
the number of DRGs for newborn babies and AIDS 
patients. They also developed DRG weights specifi-
cally for the state’s non-Medicare population.
Washington (Exhibit 9). Rate-setting regulation com-
menced in Washington State in 1975 and was ter-
minated in 1989. The program was operated by an 
independent commission, and involved a review of 
hospital budgets with guidelines specified in regula-
tion, hearings, and negotiation.15 Over that time period, 
costs per EIPA rose by 404 percent, more than the 345 
percent national rate of increase over the same period. 
Since the regulation was terminated, costs per EIPA in 
Washington have continued to increase faster than the 
nation: 159 percent in Washington compared with 121 
percent in the U.S. as a whole.
Exhibit 8. New York Cost Per EIPA 
Relative to the United States
Source: American Hospital Association, AHA Hospital Statistics.
Year
New York cost per EIPA/U.S. cost per EIPA
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Washington’s approach provides an interesting 
contrast to the rate-setting programs in the northeast-
ern states. The legislation establishing the Washington 
Hospital Commission was almost identical to that in 
Maryland, but its outcome was dramatically different. 
The Washington Hospital Commission took a different 
approach to rate-setting than did the Maryland Health 
Services Cost Review Commission. Where Maryland 
relied on incentives in the payment system to control 
hospital expenditures, Washington relied on a detailed 
annual review of the costs and charges of each hospital 
to do so.
Even though the allowances provided by the 
Washington Hospital Commission were generous, and 
the rate of inflation in hospital costs in Washington 
State exceeded the national average over the period of 
the regulation, the hospital industry was antagonistic 
toward the regulatory system and in 1989 managed to 
bring it to an end. Such antagonism is an almost inevi-
table outcome of a system involving annual budget 
reviews. Such detailed reviews substitute the judgment 
of regulators for the judgment of hospital administra-
tors, and may thus arouse the ire of administrators who 
feel their authority is being undermined.
West Virginia (Exhibit 10). While West Virginia was 
relatively late in enacting rate-setting, passing the 
enabling legislation in 1983 and starting regulation in 
1985, its program is still operating. It is operated by 
an independent commission, the West Virginia Health 
Care Authority, which sets revenue limits for nongov-
ernmental payers. The hospitals request rate increases 
each year and these are reviewed using guidelines 
specified in regulation, hearings, and negotiation.16 
From 1985 to 2007, costs per EIPA in West Virginia 
increased by 192 percent, compared with a nationwide 
increase of 213 percent.
dISCuSSIon And ConCluSIonS 
The data analyzed here indicate that rate-setting can 
be successful in controlling the rate of increase in hos-
pital costs. However, its success depends on the way 
in which it is carried out, as well as regulators’ abil-
ity to enforce the rates set and to exact penalties for 
noncompliance. The rate-setting system in Maryland 
has had a dramatic impact on the rate of increase in 
hospital costs per EIPA, and the rate-setting systems in 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York were simi-
larly successful while they were in operation. Since the 
demise of rate-setting in Massachusetts, New Jersey, 
and New York, the states’ hospital costs have increased 
at rates close to or above the national average.
It is often assumed that regulation is less effec-
tive than competition in controlling costs. The results 
discussed here suggest that regulation can more 
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Source: American Hospital Association, AHA Hospital Statistics.
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effectively control hospital costs than does the limited 
competition that currently exists in the marketplace for 
hospital services.
The states included in this study are those 
generally considered to have had (or currently have) 
mandatory rate-setting systems and, with the exception 
of West Virginia (which started its system much later 
than the other states) were included in the 1980 evalu-
ation of rate-setting by Biles et al.17 Other states have 
enacted different forms of regulation. For example, 
Arizona, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Vermont had 
budget review systems with mandatory participation. 
Arizona, Rhode Island, and Vermont, but particularly 
Rhode Island, fared better in controlling the rate of 
hospital costs than most other states, suggesting  
that their regulatory programs also had an impact 
(Exhibit 2).
The Medicare program provides an example 
of a regulatory effort to set hospital payment rates 
on a nationwide scale. Its inpatient prospective pay-
ment system (IPPS), which was implemented in 1983 
and pays hospitals a fixed price (adjusted for patient 
and market characteristics that may affect costs but 
are beyond the hospital’s control), generally has been 
effective in controlling Medicare hospital spend-
ing. After implementation of the system, there were 
substantial reductions in the length of inpatient hos-
pital stays, with no decline in quality, and hospital 
costs have steadily decreased as a proportion of total 
Medicare spending.18 However, the impact of the IPPS 
has decreased over time, as hospitals have moved ser-
vices from the inpatient setting to other settings. This, 
in turn, has led Medicare to expand their rate-setting 
approaches to apply to many other settings.
In addition, private insurers have complained 
about “cost-shifting,” or having to pay higher rates for 
hospital services as Medicare and Medicaid payment 
rates fail to keep up with hospital costs. Indeed, from 
1997 to 2007, Medicare payments relative to hospital 
costs declined from 104 percent to 91 percent, while 
private payers have seen their payments climb from 
116 percent to 132 percent of hospital costs.19 While 
there are many interpretations about the possible impli-
cations of these trends, they indicate the difficulty of 
attempting to set rates for individual payers, rather than 
taking a more comprehensive approach.
Rate-setting has generally applied to inpatient 
services only. Although the use of EIPAs as a measure 
of hospital production is common, it makes an implicit 
assumption that inpatient and outpatient costs are 
proportional to inpatient and outpatient charges. This 
has become less true over time, as hospitals have dif-
ferentially increased charges to inpatient and outpatient 
services in response to various incentives in the pay-
ment systems. Ideally, rate-setting approaches would 
be comprehensive, including both inpatient and outpa-
tient activities as a “package.” An advantage of such 
an approach, or even of regulation of EIPAs rather than 
inpatient rates alone, is that it would encourage substi-
tution of different types of care for traditional inpatient 
care and potentially encourage greater efficiency in the 
use of health care resources.
Finally, it is worth considering the fact that 
hospital care represents 31 percent of overall national 
health care spending.20 Thus, even a modest decrease in 
hospital expenditures—say, on the order of 5 percent, 
a level that was met or exceeded in most states adopt-
ing hospital rate regulation—would achieve an annual 
savings of $35 billion, based on 2007 expenditures. 
With a sharply rising federal deficit, and the potential 
for substantial additional federal costs related to health 
reform, every cost-saving alternative should be consid-
ered. Rate-setting approaches have proven successful 
on the state level, and could help control the growth in 
health care spending.
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